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INTRODUCTION
The greatest threat to our country's national security is the danger that we
will not change our thinking to coincide with the changes in the world. Interna-
tional leadership in the next century will require different strengths than were
necessary in the last half century. Economic and social assets will overshadow
military might as the primary determinants of world influence. As our friends
and allies become less intimidated by the fading Soviet military threat,' they
become less willing to follow our lead. America's international influence in the
future will be based largely on our economic strength and on our ability to
create a social and political model for other nations to follow.
The implications for America's Intelligence Community are clear. Develop-
ments in the world around us coupled with increasing budgetary constraints at
home will force the most sweeping changes in our intelligence system since
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was created by the National Security Act
forty-four years ago.2 The task of Congress and the President is to redefine the
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very mission of intelligence in the new world. Any suggested new roles must
be carefully examined to ensure that they legitimately reflect the needs of the
Intelligence Community and do not perpetuate unnecessary budget expenditures.
This Essay examines the role of the Intelligence Community and congres-
sional oversight in light of the dramatic developments in the world. Part I
identifies key issues that the Intelligence Community must address in order to
maintain America's position in the world. Part II examines recent improvements
in congressional oversight. Finally, Part III offers legislative proposals designed
to cope with future challenges to the Intelligence Community.
I. THE CHALLENGES
As Robert Gates takes the helm as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI),
he must perform major surgery on the CIA and the entire Intelligence Commu-
nity. For the past few decades, the principal purpose of American intelligence
has been to detect Soviet plans and actions, to deter Soviet aggression when
possible, and to defeat the Soviets when they moved against our interests
anywhere in the world. This meant that a major part of our resources was used
to monitor and analyze Soviet and Eastern bloc military activities and to
penetrate the highly concentrated civilian power structure in the Communist
Party and the Soviet government. Developments in virtually every part of the
world were viewed through the prism of Soviet-American competition. For
example, Soviet economic projects in Third World nations were not treated as
important targets in themselves, but were considered only in relation to the
impact that they might have on the balance of power between the United States
and the Soviet Union. Economic changes were viewed not as the principal
determinants of power and influence in the world, but as factors that might have
some influence upon military and political strength.
The United States now confronts a world in which economic power in and
of itself is far more important in determining world leadership. High quality
economic analysis is vital as policymakers struggle to rebuild our economic
strength at home and to determine the best market opportunities abroad. In
addition, the major threat to world stability now comes not from the decisions
of a small group of rulers in the Kremlin but from the danger of racial, ethnic,
or nationalist strife brought about by unstable economic and social conditions.3
3. See generally James Brooke, As Centralized Rule Wanes, Ethnic Tension Rises Anew in Soviet
Georgia, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at A3; George J. Church, Into the Void; Suddenly the Old Soviet Union
Is Gone. Now New Leaders Are Improvising on a Grand Scale to Shape a New Nation-or Nations--from
the Chaos, TIME, Sept. 1, 1991, at 26; Don Oberdorfer, Soviet "Collapse" Shifts the Axis of Global Politics,
WAsH. PosT, Sept. 1, 1991, at A35; John Tagliabue, Old Tribal Rivalries in Eastern Europe Pose Threat
of infection, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 13, 1991, § 4, at 2. For a thoughtful discussion of the new challenges to the
Intelligence Community in the post-Cold War era, see Russell J. Bruemmer, Intelligence Community
Reorganization: Declining the Invitation to Struggle, 101 YALE L.J. 867 (1992).
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In many ways, the dangers posed to world peace in the last part of this
decade resemble the threats of the 1930's more than they resemble the threats
of the 1980's. Developments in Yugoslavia provide clear early warning sig-
nals.4 While it is highly unlikely that the Russian Republic will ever again have
a threatening leader who calls himself a Communist, it is not impossible that
hunger and disorder in Moscow could lead to the kind of collapse that brought
Hitler to power in Germany in the 1930's. Any dictator who controls weapons
of mass destruction is extremely dangerous, whether he marches under the
banner of communism, nationalism, or racism. American intelligence, long
aimed at penetrating leadership and command groups, must now develop a
greater ability to predict popular attitudes and actions. It requires a different
kind of ability to read the mood of the people on the streets of Moscow,
Baghdad, or Panama City than to interpret the way in which a military com-
mander fits into a preconceived order of battle. In many ways, the complex
world of the late 1990's will be more difficult to understand than the world of
the Cold War period. The simple lens of superpower confrontation can no
longer be used to view the world around us.
In addition, American leadership will rely more upon collective action, and
intelligence must therefore provide policymakers with more information about
the tools of persuasion. As strength and influence are increasingly defined in
economic and social terms, the United States will no longer have the dominance
to take purely unilateral action that it had when power was defined in military
terms. Clearly, there is no time to waste in reordering our priorities to meet the
new challenge. With most of the resources of our current multibillion-dollar
intelligence budget devoted directly or indirectly to the Soviet threat, changes
must be made. In addition, it should be possible to achieve major budgetary
savings that can be channeled constructively into other programs. Neither the
executive branch, which manages the Intelligence Community, nor Congress,
which authorizes and funds its programs, can by itself bring about the sweeping
changes that are needed. The two branches must work together as never before.
The new DCI may play the key role in bringing them together in a constructive
way.
II. RECENT CONGRESSIONAL AcTIvITIEs
The process of change has already begun. For well over a year, the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) has been conducting a study of the
structure of the Intelligence Community through a series of hearings and
personal interviews with a wide cross section of present and former senior
government officials, intelligence experts, and historians. The SSCI has had the
4. See generally David Binder, Ethnic Conflict in Yugoslavia Tearing Apart Its Army, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 1, 1991, at Al; John M. Goshko, Yugoslavia Is Puzzling Problem For U.S., Allies; Rival Factions
Largely Ignore Appeals to End a Conflict Rooted in Ethnic Hatreds, WASH. PosT, Sept. 22, 1991, at A31.
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dual task of improving the oversight process and looking ahead to determine
new challenges for the Intelligence Community.
Over the past few years, Congress has moved to improve the oversight
process. The SSCI created its own independent auditing unit, which for the first
time allows Congress to determine if funds for the most secret projects are
being spent appropriately.5 The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence has followed suit. As a result, Congress no longer depends upon the CIA
to police itself. Vigorous oversight by the committees has resulted in the
cancellation of some programs where problems were uncovered.6 In addition,
these actions have served as a deterrent in other areas.
In 1990, Congress established an independent statutory Inspector General
at the CIA whose appointment is subject to Senate confirmation. 7 Before
passage of this statute, the Inspector General was an employee of the Director
of the CIA who was selected by the Director and who reported to him. Now,
the Inspector General is appointed by the President and must be confirmed by
the Senate. By law, the Inspector General can either initiate investigations
himself or at the request of the Director. If there is a disagreement between the
Inspector General and the Director about the subject or scope of an investiga-
tion, the Inspector General has a responsibility to report the disagreement to
the intelligence committees. This ensures that the Director and others in the
CIA will not be able to cover up any irregularity. In addition, annual reports
of all activities of the Inspector General must be furnished to the committees.
In 1991, Congress passed an Intelligence Authorization Bill that contained
historic reforms in the covert action oversight process, reflecting lessons learned
from the Iran-Contra affair.' The new statute tightens the definitions of "covert
actions" and "timely notice." Presidents traditionally assert that any effort to
set up a rigid time requirement on notice of covert actions is an invasion by
Congress of the President's constitutional prerogatives as Commander-in-Chief.
President Bush, therefore, strongly objected to a proposal to define "timely
notice" to mean "within 48 hours" and made it clear that he would veto any
bill containing such a provision. He did, however, commit himself in a letter
to the committee to conduct his own actions under the statute in a manner
consistent with the term "timely notice," meaning "within a few days," except
in extraordinary circumstances that required him to assert his constitutional
authority.9 The committee included the President's letter in its report accompa-
5. See FRANK SMIST, CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNTrED STATES INTELLIGENCE COmaUNITY, 1947-
1989, at 269 (1990); REPORT OF THE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES SENATE, JAN. 1,
1987 TO DEC. 31, 1988, S. REP. No. 219, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 18-19 (1989).
6. S. REP. No. 219, supra note 5.
7. 50 U.S.C. § 403q (1988).
8. Pub. L. No. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429 (1991) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 413).
9. Letter from George Bush, President of the United States, to Dave McCurdy, Chairman of the House
Select Comm. on Intelligence (Oct. 30, 1989), reprinted in INTELLIGENCE AUTHORIZATION ACT, FISCAL
YEAR 1991, CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 166, 102d Cong., Ist Sess. 27 (1991). The author,
Chairman of the SSCI, and Representative Dave McCurdy, Chairman of the HPSCI, received similar letters
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nying the Intelligence Authorization Act for 1991 and restated Congress' view
that the statute meant "within a few days" and that there was no constitutional
basis to disregard the statute.'" Congress did, however, reaffirm its statutory
inability to alter the powers conferred by the Constitution upon the President."
The Authorization Act outlaws retroactive Presidential findings and requires
third-party involvement in covert actions to be revealed to congressional
oversight committees. 2 In the past, some covert activities have contributed
to the collapse of Soviet communism by increasing the cost of Soviet aggres-
sion. For example, the efforts to make the Soviets pay a high price for their
invasion of Afghanistan were extremely successful, in large part due to the
unified support of the American people. On the other hand, other covert actions
failed, notably when the actions were not consistent with publicly stated
principles of American foreign policy or when there was an attempt to act
secretly without true public consensus on the issue. For example, there was no
public consensus regarding aid to the Contras in Nicaragua. In fact, divisions
were so deep in this country that Congress reversed its direction on Contra aid
ten times in the course of five years. 3 Each time aid was resumed, different
conditions were attached to it. These frequent reversals not only caused policy
confusion, but also made efficient use of resources under the program almost
impossible. 4 Additionally, they helped create temptations for partisans to
continue programs secretly and illegally during periods when they were not
authorized.15
A covert action's chances for success seem largely related to its degree of
public support. This lesson from the past ten years, coupled with the changes
in the world situation and the end of superpower confrontation, make it much
less likely that large-scale paramilitary covert action will be used in the decade
ahead. Major American interventions are much more likely to be overt foreign
policy and military initiatives like those in Panama and Kuwait.
from the President.
10. Id.
11. H.R. REP. No. 166, supra note 9, at 28.
12. 50 U.S.C. § 413(a), (b) (1991).
13. See Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-453, 102 Stat. 1904 (1988);
Assistance to Central America, Pub. L No. 100-276, 102 Stat. 62 (1988); Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal
Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 101 Stat. 1329 (1987); Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1988,
Pub. L No. 100-178, 101 Stat. 1009 (1987); Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
120, 101 Stat. 789 (1987); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,
100 Stat. 3816 (1986); Continuing Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341
(1986); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, 100 Stat. 3190 (1986);
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-169,99 Stat. 1002 (1985); Supplemental
Appropriations Act 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stat. 293 (1985).
14. See, e.g., PRELIMNARY INQUIRY INTO THE SALE OF ARMS TO IRAN AND POSSIBLE DIVERSION OF
FUNDS TO THE NICARAGUAN RESISTANCE, S. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 39 (1987).
15. Id. This diversion also contributed to a less than decisive result in Nicaragua, where the government
is officially under the control of President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro while instruments of power like
the army and police remain under the control of her Sandinista rivals. See Shirley Christian, In Managua,
Angry Reminder of Sandinista Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1991, at A6; see also S. REP. NO. 7, supra
note 14, at 39.
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Reforms in the oversight process have been difficult because congressional
oversight of intelligence is an issue of major constitutional significance. The
activities of the oversight committees, created in response to various CIA and
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) abuses during the early 1970's,16 are
inherently controversial; the mere existence of the committees in some ways
circumscribes the power of the Presidency. The committees themselves, acting
responsibly, must balance appropriate congressional assertion against the
infringement of executive power. Even in an institutionally contentious context,
it is important to attain bipartisan cooperation toward an effective national
intelligence effort that is consistent with the values and requirements of a
democratic society.
III. PROPOSAL FOR RESTRUCTURING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Changes in the oversight process and the rules governing covert action will
improve the future effectiveness of the Intelligence Community. They currently
work to correct past mistakes rather than to effect the fundamental transforma-
tion of the Intelligence Community that is now necessary. The broad outlines
of the new Intelligence Community, reflecting a reordering of priorities, are
beginning to take shape.
A. Integration of Intelligence
There must be a closer integration of the intelligence functions of the
Departments of Defense and State with those of the CIA. For budgetary
reasons, we can no longer afford to fund separate and often competitive intelli-
gence empires. Some have suggested abolishing the CIA and placing all
intelligence functions under the State Department.17 Such a move would be
unwise for several reasons. First, it would merge intelligence collection and
intelligence analysis functions, thereby endangering the arm's-length relation-
ship between those who must provide information and those charged with
making policy. Second, the State Department alone cannot undertake all
intelligence functions, since some intelligence collection methods are inappro-
priate for diplomatic missions. Finally, the State Department is not organized
to put intelligence into a form useful to the military in times of conflict.
While it would not be advisable to make the CIA part of the State Depart-
ment, certain State Department assets are more useful to the intelligence process
than they were before. The State Department's overt intelligence gathering can
operate more effectively in previously closed societies, like the Soviet Union,
that are now much more open. Some of the analysis previously done at the
16. See SELECr COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. NO. 755, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976).
17. S. 236, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301-303 (1991) (introduced by Sen. Moynihan).
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CIA, using secret sources, can be done at the State Department with open-
source information. State Department political officers stationed on the scene
may actually be better than Langley-based CIA analysts who have limited on-
site experience.
In addition to responding to budgetary pressures, better integration of
military and civilian intelligence will improve the quality of intelligence and
enhance its usefulness in times of conflict. For example, joint exercises involv-
ing civilian intelligence officers and uniformed military commanders that
simulate wartime conditions, which have never been held in the past, would
be a welcome practice. It makes sense to fill some key CIA posts-perhaps the
position of Deputy Director of Central Intelligence-with military officers and
to fill key positions at the Pentagon and the Defense Intelligence Agency with
civilian CIA employees. In that way, each group will become more sensitive
to the needs of the other. During the recent Persian Gulf conflict, civilian
officers were not fully integrated into General Schwarzkopf's command.18
General Schwarzkopf noted that during the Gulf War, the intelligence agencies
in Washington had a system of bomb damage assessment that confused military
commanders because the assessments failed to indicate whether a potentially
damaged facility was still militarily functional. 9 A more effectively integrated
Intelligence Community might have provided a useful remedy for this deficien-
cy.
While it is generally agreed that in this era of diminishing resources for
defense and intelligence we must integrate and streamline organizations to
improve budgetary efficiency, the task will not be easy. Unfortunately, it is
precisely during periods of belt tightening that organizations most fiercely
defend themselves and most doggedly rationalize the need for continued growth.
Above all else, bureaucracy hates change. When the Goldwater-Nichols Depart-
ment of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was passed,2" it was anathema
to every branch of the armed services. While Goldwater-Nichols did not
specifically address intelligence, it did give greater authority to theater com-
manders-in-chiefs (CINC's) around the world2 as opposed to the chiefs of
the individual branches-Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. In doing so,
it also gave greater importance to CINC's as consumers of intelligence. This
has led the Department of Defense and the whole Intelligence Community to
reassess how intelligence support for these commanders is organized and carried
out. As a consequence, "Joint Intelligence Centers"' are being established
at each theater command to serve as conduits for intelligence support funneled
18. See, e.g., Operation Desert ShieldlDesert Storm: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 341-42 (1991) [hereinafter Schwarzkopf Testimony].
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. No. 99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
21. Id. §§ 161-166.
22. See S. REP. No. 117, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1991).
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to the CINC's from both national and tactical intelligence gatherers. For the
first time, theater commanders are given authority to conduct joint exercises
during peacetime that integrate all civilian and military intelligence assets into
the command structure, thereby ensuring that all elements will be prepared to
work together in times of actual crisis. In short, the Goldwater-Nichols empha-
sis on "jointness" of command has already been carried over into the intelli-
gence framework. The joint command structure established by Goldwater-
Nichols contributed immeasurably, in my view, to our victory in the Gulf War.
Intelligence should follow suit and organize its extraordinary capabilities to
satisfy the requirements of military commanders in the most effective way.
B. Human Intelligence
The second major feature of the new Intelligence Community will be its
emphasis on human source intelligence. With a smaller American military force,
largely based in the United States, earlier warning of the hostile intentions of
potential adversaries will grow in importance. While satellite photographs and
other technical data can reveal military movements before an attack, they cannot
provide early warning of an enemy's intentions. Had the President known of
Saddam Hussein's aims months-instead of only days-before Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait, he could have considered other options, such as joint military
maneuvers with Saudi Arabia, which might have avoided the war altogether.
More effective human intelligence sources might have provided this informa-
tion.
Human sources are also more effective intelligence gatherers in other areas
of strategic importance. For example, they can penetrate increasingly important
targets like terrorist organizations and international drug rings. In addition, they
are the best means of collecting economic intelligence. Satellite photographs
cannot provide much information about what a small terrorist cell is planning
or about the significance of certain commercial technologies. While electronic
surveillance can be helpful in certain situations, terrorists and drug dealers,
among others, are becoming increasingly sophisticated about communications.
In all of these cases, there is simply no real substitute for a good human source
who has penetrated the inner circle. Perhaps of greatest concern, human source
intelligence is much less expensive than costly, high-technology, collection
equipment. A major increase in human collection capabilities could be achieved
while substantially reducing total intelligence spending.
To improve human intelligence, it is necessary to define national security
in a broader sense. The quality of an intelligence agent or analyst depends
largely upon the quality of his or her education and training. The development
of the National Security Education Act of 1991 by the SSCI recognizes the
[Vol. 101: 853
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contribution of improved education to national security. 3 The Act provides
scholarships for American undergraduates to study overseas; grants to colleges
and universities to strengthen curricula in foreign languages, area studies, and
international studies; and graduate fellowships for students interested in govern-
ment service in areas where expertise is needed.' This year, $35 million were
provided for the scholarships and grants, and another $150 million have been
placed in a fund to endow the program permanently.' While there is no
government employment obligation for undergraduates who spend less than a
calendar year abroad,26 many of these students will undoubtedly become
sufficiently interested in regional studies to pursue graduate programs. If a job
is offered, a graduate fellowship recipient would be required to accept employ-
ment with the Intelligence Community, State Department, Commerce Depart-
ment, or some other agency, on the basis of three years of service for one year
of education? Even for those undergraduates who do not ultimately enter
government service, the nation will be benefitted by having more leaders in the
private sector who have an international outlook.
C. Economic Intelligence
The new Intelligence Community will place an increased emphasis on
economic intelligence. Though defining the appropriate limits of economic
intelligence will not be an easy task, some fruitful areas of investigation are
obvious. For example, deterring the theft of industrial secrets of private Ameri-
can companies is absolutely necessary.28 Counterintelligence efforts in this
direction are already underway, but they must be intensified, and clearer
warnings about the threat must be given to the private sector. We must also
consider whether our current criminal code provisions are adequate to deter
economic espionage. Current laws focus primarily on the theft of classified
information. The classification process deals almost exclusively with military
secrets and with work done under government control, as opposed to purely
private commercial ventures.
We must consider how to deal with efforts by foreign intelligence services
to obtain unfairly advance notice of contract or bidding opportunities in Third
World countries, which give their companies an advantage over ours. In
addition, we should obtain information about the economic negotiation strate-
23. S. 1359, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 701 (1991).
24. Id.
25. See S. REP. No. 117, supra note 22, at 15.
26. S. 1359, supra note 23, § 701.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., William M. Carley, As Cold War Fades, Some Nations' Spies Seek Industrial Secrets,
WALL ST. J., June 17, 1991, at AI; Eduardo Lachica, Businesses Try to Get Smart With Ex-Spies, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 8, 1991, at BI; James M. Lamont, As Red Menace Cools, Spies Go Corporate, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 22, 1991, at A12; Micheal Wines, French Said to Spy on U.S. Computer Companies, N.Y. TwIEs, Nov.
18, 1990, at 4.
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gies of other countries and foreign competitors where possible. Just as in the
past when it was important to understand fully the military strategies and goals
of potential opponents, in the economic arena we need to know at least as much
about the game plans of our adversaries as they know about ours. We should
also use our knowledge of the economic needs and the political influence of
economic power structures in other countries to gain support for our objectives
in multinational negotiations. In sum, it is appropriate to use our intelligence
assets to level the playing field and to allow American companies an equal
chance to compete.
Whether U.S. intelligence assets should be used to obtain secrets from
private foreign companies poses a more difficult question.29 Operating without
parameters in this area could easily lead to violations of basic American values
and principles. Full-scale, unrestrained efforts to use the CIA to steal economic
secrets of private companies in other countries would be inconsistent with the
nature of the free enterprise system. For example, if an automotive secret were
stolen in retaliation for similar action by a foreign power, with whom would
the information be shared-General Motors, Ford, or Chrysler? Nevertheless,
we must ask ourselves what we should do if others are stealing this information
from us. How can we retaliate in a way that will halt their continuing economic
aggression? If all other efforts have failed to halt the aggressive espionage of
a foreign government, perhaps as a last resort, we could retaliate by sharing
information obtained with all American producers in a public forum. Answers
to these questions will require careful reflection and strategies developed jointly
with the Commerce, Treasury, and other departments. To date, no clear policy
guidance is available to the Intelligence Community.
We also need a mechanism to identify those exclusively American technol-
ogies that should not be allowed to fall into foreign hands. Often, a foreign
government or company does not steal our technology outright; it simply buys
a controlling interest in an American company on the open market. We must
develop tools to prevent such foreign acquisitions when there are strong nation-
al security reasons for doing so. While there are laws and regulations in place
that restrain the foreign ownership of U.S. firms doing classified work for the
government, there are many technologies that are not themselves classified, yet
could have significant national security implications. High-speed computer
technology, for example, is not classified, but it has myriad applications in the
design of weapons and weapon-delivery systems. While the President has the
statutory authority to delay acquisitions of U.S. firms by foreign interests where
national security considerations are involved, this authority is rarely used. In
fact, the government has a difficult time evaluating the acquisitions that are
taking place in terms of their significance to national security. There is no
29. See, e.g., Should US. Agencies Spy on Foreign Corporations?, WALL ST. J., June 17, 1991, at A5;
Micheal Wimes, Evolution in Europe; Security Agency Debates New Role: Economic Spying, N.Y. TIMES,
June 8, 1990, at Al.
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central location in the government where this monitoring takes place. Indeed,
there are no practical tools in place, such as finance mechanisms, for the
President's immediate use to assure that firms up for sale are not acquired by
foreign corporations.
D. Integrity of Analysis
The analytic function of the Intelligence Community must be improved.
The quality of decisions made by policymakers in preparing America for the
next century will be significantly affected by the quality of intelligence analysis.
Much more use needs to be made of open sources. We need to encourage
increased analysis from political and commercial officers in our embassies
around the world. The Community should stop trying to reach cautious, con-
sensus-oriented intelligence estimates, described by General Schwarzkopf as
"unhelpful because [they are] so caveated." 30 Instead, to assure crisp, usable,
and predictable intelligence, and to protect the integrity of the intelligence
process (against a tendency to politicize the estimates in order to tell policy-
makers what they want to hear), majority and minority views should be present-
ed separately, along with the rationale behind each viewpoint.
The integrity of the analytical process is crucial. Billions of dollars spent
on intelligence collection will be wasted if the analysis is not both objective
and clear. If the aim is simply to tell policymakers what they want to hear, no
data collection is necessary-an analyst with a typewriter will suffice. Analysts
must avoid being risk averse. Avoiding blame by being vague and refusing to
take a position may preserve a bureaucratic job, but it does not inform the
policymaker. During the confirmation hearings on the nomination of Robert
Gates to become Director of Central Intelligence, there was a thorough and
highly unusual public criticism of the current methods of analyzing intelligence
data.31 Mr. Gates himself conceded that there was a danger that analysts might
consciously or unconsciously react to the perceived ideological biases of their
supervisors. 2 He made several suggestions for changing the current process
to encourage risk taking, to make intelligence more crisp and prediction orient-
ed, and to reflect more fully dissenting views. Establishing a process for
separately presenting majority and minority views, much as in a Supreme Court
decision, should help push analysts to state more clearly their individual views
and to assume responsibility for them.
30. See Schwarzkopf Testimony, supra note 18.
31. See Nomination Hearings: Divergent Portrait of Gates Presented by Witness, 49 CONG. Q. 2901
(1991).
32. Id. at 2906.
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E. The Role of the Director of Central Intelligence
The role of the Director of Central Intelligence should be seriously re-
evaluated. Can the Director effectively wear two hats, serving both as head of
the CIA and as head of the entire Intelligence Community at the same time?
Can the DCI act effectively as a referee between competing agencies, especially
if his own agency is one of the competitors? These are the kinds of concerns
which prompted proposals for the creation of a new position, a Director of
National Intelligence,33 separate from the CIA, to head the Intelligence Com-
munity. While this proposal certainly should not be dismissed out of hand, it
has its shortcomings. In Washington, a government official without employees
of his or her own usually has no power. There is a very real possibility that if
a new Director of National Intelligence were established, separate from the
CIA, it would soon develop an expensive and redundant bureaucracy of its
own.
34
The better alternative is not to eliminate the DCI's powers as head of the
Intelligence Community, but to strengthen them. If there is to be more coordi-
nation among military, civilian, diplomatic, and commercial intelligence agen-
cies, the DCI must be the true coordinator of the entire Intelligence Community,
not just a figurehead. At the very least, the Director must have powers similar
to those of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget when it
comes to making budgetary allocations. The DCI also should be a participant
in the appointment process when directors are chosen for other intelligence
agencies like the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agen-
cy. Currently, these agencies are largely controlled by the Secretary of Defense,
even though they are supposed to receive intelligence tasking from the DCI.
F. Other Threats
Stopping the proliferation of ballistic missiles, and of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapons, should be a major focus of the reconstituted Intelligence
Community. While the intelligence agencies already credibly track the spread
of these weapons, more effort is required, especially through the use of im-
proved human sources. Regrettably, much of the intelligence already collected
has not been fully used because policymakers have had other priorities. Due
to superpower competition in the past, we often hesitated to act against coun-
tries whose help we needed against the Soviet bloc. The decline of the Cold
War provides a great opportunity to make cooperation between the superpowers
the centerpiece of a new world order. It is time for the United States to propose
that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and Japan enter
33. S. 421, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 175, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
34. For a solid analysis of the DNI proposal, see Bruemmer, supra note 3, at 886-87.
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into clear and enforceable agreements to act against their own companies found
guilty of assisting other nations in the design and proliferation of nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. In addition, sanctions should be used against
nations found guilty of attempting to develop such weapons. NATO should then
seek an agreement from the United Nations for a similar process. The almost
unified sanctions taken against Iraq show that such concentrated action is
possible when it comes to nuclear weapons programs.
There are obviously many more areas that deserve attention in redesigning
the Intelligence Community. Some existing assets can be retargeted. Technolo-
gies used to track missiles, for example, could be helpful in gathering informa-
tion to meet global environmental challenges. Satellites and other national
technical systems could be used to monitor the loss of tropical rain forests.
They might also assist in obtaining more accurate information on air quality
in all parts of the world. These systems could also provide early warning of
natural disasters and climate changes as well as warning of man-made environ-
mental disasters like Chernobyl and the oil spills of the Gulf War. Because
environmental problems know no national borders, it is time to enter into
international agreements to allow our intelligence systems to be used to collect
and share important environmental data.
CONCLUSION
There is no time to waste. The world has fundamentally changed, and the
Intelligence Community must change with it. If it does not, the Intelligence
Community will become an overly expensive and irrelevant dinosaur just when
America most needs information and insight to meet challenges even tougher
than those presented by the Cold War.
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